Wednesday, May 21, 2014

What a bug's life can teach us about investing


A new Utah State University study (here's a look at some interesting research previously done at the University of Colorado) separates chance from choice in the process of genetic mutation.  The study is interesting on its own—offering insight into how and under what conditions creatures might be capable of adapting to habitat shifts—it also offers those looking for mental models to apply elsewhere an extraordinary look at evolutionary change. 



What do bugs have to do with investing?

Thinkers ranging from Charlie Munger to Robert Hagstrom laud biology and evolutionary theory as providing especial illumination to understanding similar processes in economics and market behavior. Hagstrom’s book “Investing: The Last Liberal Art” draws parallels between natural selection and the evolution of profitable trading strategies; unprofitable strategies, he suggests, will die off in the process of competition. 



“At the market level, what we think and have done well is to recognize that it’s not an equilibrium-based theory, as modern portfolio theory dictates it should be,” Hagstrom said. “But that it’s more biological in nature.” 

Because of his study in biological systems, Hagstrom isn’t fazed when financial markets act in ways that would horrify anyone steeped in physical models (a more fecund source for the mathematical-driven rational choice theory-based economic modeling that inspire work done by many interested in forecasting economic behavior). Stuff that doesn’t occur in physics—five standard deviation, non-linear events—happen all the time in biological systems.
 
Principles of predictable adaptation

USU scientist Zachariah Gompert, who worked on the new study, asks the kind of question many investors would love to know, "As we change the landscape, change the environment, it would be nice to know how populations can evolve or not. It seems like there are components that are predictable."

To locate the kind of predictable responses that have inspired Hagstrom and others, the USU research team looked at insect genomes of the timema cristianae, isolating genetic mutations of the in the same places. They determined that separate populations of the insects that had adapted to the same plant had nearly twenty percent of mutations in common. "There’s a significant portion of the genome that is showing these repeatable patterns," Gompert said.

Gompert and colleagues tried to glean predictable components in this process by looking at two varieties of the same species of stick insects that possess different physical characteristics. Each of these adapts into two ecotypes: one with a black the other a green stripe down its back. These adaptations provide camoflauge in the plant species native to California’s Santa Ynez Mountains where they live.

"We have a population repeatedly adapting to some similar environment … either it takes the same route each time or it doesn’t," Gompert said. "Most people look at it in the context of a single trait or gene. Here, we’re able to say, if we looked across the entire genome, is it doing the same thing if you expose it to the same environment?"

Testing the hypothesis

Not content to identify predictable patterns and similar mutations, the team took an additional, and interesting step. If the evolutionary response exhibited by the insects were really as predictable as they thought, wouldn’t they be able to guess how they’d change in response to different stimuli? They thought so. So, they moved a population of the stick insects to a new plant to find out. 

Ceanothus Green Timea little leaf herbivory Perferential attack where Timea on Adenostoma are green
Why the T. cristinae changed her stripes.


One generation later, the team observed genetic divergences in the species that were about 1.5 times more likely to correlate with each other than random chance would predict.
"There’s this core set of things that seem to be predictable from long-term patterns in nature and from our experiments," Gompert said, "and they seem to be important things."

Timothy Farkas and a team from the University of Colorado team provides an explanation of some of those important things. By empirically examining the ecological effects of evolutionary processes other than natural selection--their study also looked at gene flow and founder effects--they were able to observe "ongoing effects of rapid evolutionary processes on ecology: year after year, natural selection rapidly increases local adaptation, and gene flow breaks it down, allowing eco-evolutionary effects to persist through time." 

It is fascinating to know that the evolutionary changes to T. cristinae due to its habitat are accounted for in this way: "that poor camouflage...approximately 7% of variation in population size...the effects of host-plant species 5% and habitat patch size 14%." 

Charlie Munger, Blaise Pascal, and the psychology of misjudgment in ‘the gambler’s fallacy’

The psychology of misjudgment and the gambler's fallacy

The New Yorker recently posted a devilishly interesting piece on the myth of the hot hand in gambling. (The author, Jay Caspian Kang, writes both for the New Yorker and ESPN.com’s Grantland). This topic has received much scrutiny in the sports world (including a spate of debunking articles, followed by a more optimistic piece—don’t be too surprised if subsequent studies take a similarly non-liner explanatory path). This study is the first of its kind I’ve seen applied to gambling. Though, I have seen more evidence than I’d care to recall of the phenomenon in practice. 

"The Gambler" Fyodor Dostoevsky
A new study on the existence of a 'hot hand' in gambling is something out of a Dostoevsky novel.


This piece is rich in what Munger calls ‘the psychology of misjudgment’—right down to the commissioning body: the ‘Responsible Gambling Trust’, an organization funded by casino companies trying to find ways to prevent problem betting. You can bet that the headlines the study will generate—‘New Report: Hot Hand Real in Gambling’—will discourage very, very few problem gamblers.

The study results were staggering. It examined more than 500,000 bets taken from an online sports-gambling site too gauge the effect that previous wins and losses had on future wins and losses. Within the study, the overall winning percentage for all bets was about forty-eight percent. Isolating only winning initial bets, the study authors found that in their next bet, the winners won at a rate of forty-nine percent. That a nice, but not amazing, improvement. What happened next, though, was jarring. Players who had won consecutive bets won their third bet fifty-seven percent of the time. Now we’re talking. Winners of three straight won forth bets sixty-seven! percent of the time, and fifth bets seventy-two percent.
Taken from a pool with an overall winning percentage of 48, those results are worth noting. 

Hot hand, indeed. 

The losers lost in just as incredible pattern; fifty-three percent of bettors who lost their initial bet lost their subsequent wager. Sixty percent of those who retained the wherewithal to make another wager lost their third. Those who kept going got down to a twenty-three percent success rate after five straight losses. 

Of course, anyone who has spent more than thirty minutes in a casino is aware of this phenomenon. It’s even got a name: the gambler’s fallacy. “If you’ve ever called heads on a coin flip, seen the coin land tails up, and then called heads again because ‘heads is due,’” Kang reminds us,  “you’ve been caught up in the gambler’s fallacy.”

If you’re a gambler, no matter what you think: you’re wrong

The study found that gamblers on streaks—good or bad—acted under the influence of the gambler’s fallacy in a way that prolonged both winning and losing streaks. “Winning bettors began placing more prudent bets because they assumed their luck would soon run out. Losers began placing bets with longer odds because they wanted to win big when their luck finally, inevitably changed.” 

The study’s findings are taken right out of the Charlie Munger playbook. Streaky gamblers who win, it found, “do so because they expect to lose, and streaky gamblers who lose do so because they expect to win. Or, more simply put, when you’re losing, you’re wrong, but when you’re winning, you’re also wrong."

Learning the very first mental model

Basic mathematics is the very first mental model Munger suggests people add to their toolkit. “Obviously, you've got to be able to handle numbers and quantities ‑ basic arithmetic.”  As an investor, of course, Munger predictably thinks the “great useful model” is compound interest. Next, is the elementary math of permutations and combinations as discovered by Pascal and Fermat. Interestingly, the pair engaged in the project at the behest of friends who needed to fairly award stakes to players in card games that needed to be suspended or interrupted in the middle of a hand. 

The insight, though, that Munger provides that’s useful is knowing basic statistical probability can guide conduct in ways that will lead to outcomes that outperform the average. Sometimes significantly so. All that’s needed is acquiring and using the system for deriving probabilities that is “dramatically consonant with the way that the world works. And it's fundamental truth.” While probability isn’t that hard to learn, Munger thinks what is difficult is to “use it routinely almost everyday of your life.” 

It turns out, Munger argues, that people mostly can’t automatically use this system. “If you understand elementary psychology, the reason they can't is really quite simple: The basic neural network of the brain is there through broad genetic and cultural evolution. And it's not Fermat/Pascal. It uses a very crude, shortcut ‑ type of approximation.” While what we have by dint of natural ability contains elements of Pascal's formulae in it, what we have is a very poor substitute.

The improvements to natural ability may be fairly minor, but the effects can be outsized. “If you don't get this elementary, but mildly unnatural, mathematics of elementary probability into your repertoire, then you go through a long life like a one‑legged man in an ass‑kicking contest. You're giving a huge advantage to everybody else.

The Exceptions: Warren Buffett & Moe Norman

One of the most interesting aspects of Munger’s argument in that famous section of his talk on worldly wisdom is the argument he uses immediately following his assertion that our brains just aren’t wired to calculate probability effectively. “So you have to learn in a very usable way this very elementary math and use it routinely in life” he said. And I completely agree. But I’m not so sure I follow his next point, “just the way if you want to become a golfer, you can't use the natural swing that broad evolution gave you. You have to learn to have a certain grip and swing in a different way to realize your full potential as a golfer.”

You don’t have to have a subscription to the Golf channel or have committed the Tiger Woods swing coaching tree to memory to know that today’s golfers have swings that don’t exactly resemble any movement our prehistoric ancestors likely made. Unlike the major movements in CrossFit—like the squat, the deadlift, the overhead press, etc—that are required by anyone who wants to sit down, stand up, put anything on a shelf or pick up anything off the ground, the golf swing doesn’t look like anything survival would have required hundreds of thousands of years ago.

I’m not completely convinced by Munger’s analogy, though. I think there may be people who do have these kinds of aptitudes naturally. Munger’s partner Warren Buffett comes to mind, actually. A dear friend, mathematician Paul Fife, who recently died had that kind of ability. I never knew him until he was more than fifty years old…but if he didn’t have those kinds of abilities at birth, he’d been so good at doing that stuff for so long it was effortless and seemingly natural. Another, more pertinent example considering the topic of gambling, is Freeman Dyson, who cracked the code on a prisoner's dilemma strategy in which "one player can enforce a unilateral claim to an unfair share of rewards." 
There’s one example in golf, too, that would seem to run counter to Munger’s point. Moe Norman. He was a legendarily strange guy, with a weird swing to match. In fact, his social awkwardness was likely one of the factors that drove—and kept—him away from the professional golf tour. But his homemade swing was dead straight.
 


One of the hot hand in gambling authors remarks that, “If there’s one idea to take away from the study, it’s this: just don’t gamble.” And don’t get into a competition of closest-to-the-centerline with Moe Norman or his disciples.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Will the Milwaukee Bucks win the NBA Draft? Lessons from their prediciment win or lose.


Learning from Losing: the Milwaukee Bucks case study




The Milwaukee Bucks lost a lot of games last year. The team won 15 games and lost an incredible 67—that’s a .183 winning percentage. It was the worst mark by far in a league that had a handful of teams seemingly trying not to win. As a result, the team will have the best shot at winning the National Basketball Association’s draft lottery tonight. Because of it’s woeful record, the Bucks will have a one-in-four shot at landing the top pick—and with it the right to select its choice of Andrew Wiggians, Joel Embiid, Jabari Parker, Julius Randle, or any other prospect it likes.



So, perhaps things are looking up for the nearly moribund franchise. Basketball savant and Grantland writer Zach Lowe points to another development that’s nearly as big a deal as the number one overall draft pick would be. He writes, about the Bucks in a piece on National Basketball Association front office intrigue, “The team’s medical staff has partnered with an outside consultant to develop a software program that tracks individual biological data for each player — which muscles are strong, which are weak, and what those findings mean for related muscles and joints. They’ve used the information to craft individual offseason workout plans for every player on the roster — a first for the team, according to John Hammond and David Morway, the team’s GM and assistant GM, respectively.”



This is a phenomenal insight into the way having deficiencies can hurt you. It’s easier to grasp intuitively when thinking about an athlete—if his or her body has a glaring weakness, it stands to reason that his or her weakness can easily cause problems in other strong areas when moving. It’s perhaps less obvious that having intellectual areas of weakness can do the same.



Play the game you know you’re going to win




Charlie Munger’s partner Warren Buffett recently talked about “The best really know when they are playing the game that they're going to win.”



Buffet and Munger are well known to love Ted Williams's approach to hitting. He took a very scientific approach to the task—his book on the subject was even called “The Science of Hitting.” Just about the single most important variable to predicting batting success for Williams was pitch selection. Get a good pitch to hit was rule 1. Munger and Buffet approach their craft the same way—only with an additional advantage. Williams had to swing before accruing three good pitches. Buffet and Munger could theoretically wait indefinitely. 

Ted Williams's 'heat zone' batting chart from 'The Science of Hitting'
Ted Williams's 'heat zone' batting chart from 'The Science of Hitting'.


Williams even went so far as to chart his expected success rate at swinging at pitches in every possible location. Notice he didn’t bother charting his success rate outside of the strike zone. He didn’t plan on swinging at any balls not represented by the 77 that comprise the strikezone in the graphic above. And, if one account is to be believed, he didn’t need to. So good was Williams eye, so impeccable his plate discipline, an umpire was once reported to tell a young pitcher who complained about a called ball he thought had found the strike zone, “When you throw a strike, Mr. Williams will let you know.”

A display of Ted Williams's 'heat zone' in the Baseball Hall of Fame.
A display of Ted Williams's 'heat zone' in the Baseball Hall of Fame.




Buffett’s and Munger’s track records are so good, that they often get the kind of respect that the umpire apocryphally afforded Williams. But Buffett and Munger, just as much as Williams, needed to constantly display that discipline. Start swinging at bad pitches and making bad calls on stocks, and they’d get exposed pretty quickly.



Even the great ones fail sometimes



While Buffett does acknowledge that he and Munger have been quite good at staying within their circles of competence, he admits that he’s not perfect in this regard. “Charlie and I are reasonably good at knowing the perimeter of our circle of competence. I would say in my own case, I've gone out of it more often in retail than any other arena. It's easy to think you understand retail, and then subsequently find you didn't, as in the department store in Baltimore. You can say I was outside my circle when I bought Berkshire, though; I originally bought it to resell. But when I decided to buy control, that was a dumb decision -- but that worked out.”



Buffett made Mrs B, who ran Nebraske Furniture Mart, famous for having Williams-like discipline. Calling her “the ultimate” in operating within her circle of competence, Buffett pointed to what would be a curious decision for most.



Rather than take stock for Buffet’s purchase of her operation, Mrs. B wanted cash. Now, Berkshire Hathaway recently repelled a shareholder push to get the company to offer a dividend. For most, Buffett’s and Munger’s thinking goes, this is a terrible idea, because they’re so good at allocating capital, reinvesting is likely to result in vastly more profit for shareholders than getting cash. But Buffet recognizes that, for Mrs. B at least, taking cash was the better play. “She told me she wanted cash, not stock. It might seem like a bad decision, but it wasn't. She didn't know stocks. She knew cash, property, and retail, so it was a good decision.”



Of course, in the NBA, players are limited in the physical activities they can exclude in the course of their performance. Sometimes, life is like that, too. That’s where Greg Glassman’s notion of general physical preparedness comes in.



Glassman argues that 'general physical preparedness', or GPP, has been highly undervalued. "GPP has been given short shrift. There is more…especially where the margins of victory are super, super tight. I can make more ranking change in there with GPP than with sport specific training.








“Fixing chinks in your armor will manifest in improved sporting performance even when the chink was seemingly irrelevant to the activity.” Glassman provides a nice example from the real world—competitive skiing. “We got a hold of the guys at USA skiing and found out that they couldn’t do shit for pullups and the women had none. The guys sucked and the women were abysmal. And I said, ‘We’ve got to fix it.” Jonna Mendez is America’s best skier and she can’t do pull ups.” So she trained with Glassman for a summer, and by summer’s end she had 20 pull ups.  And she comes back and would tell you that pullups make a huge difference in skiing.”



Flourishing in complex environments




Glassman makes a point about fitness that translates to nearly any complex environment. “I am of the view that the demands physiologically, metabolically, hormonally, of sport are so complex that they’re not perfectly knowable," he said. His solution to dealing with this complexity is culled directly from Munger's 'latticework of mental models' playbook: "I want to throw out a broad net. I want to increase work capacity across broad time and modal domains.” What Glassman wants in the physical realm, Munger wants in the mental. 



While NBA players need to be generally physically prepared, because they can’t pick and choose their spots the way Williams could and even less the way Munger and Buffett can, the kind of identification of weakness and customized training program that Lowe cites the Bucks as having recently adopted can help. The Bucks had better hope it does, Lowe's piece points to the difficulty the team had in dealing with injuries to players such as Ersan Ilyasova, Larry Sanders, and Brandon Knight. Problems with injuries, it seems, are endemic to the organization. Consider this 2013 piece in Business Insider piece that pegged the Bucks as having paid more money to injured players than any other team in the league that season. 

Just as the Bucks are looking to improve their health through general physical preparedness, advanced metrics and other analytical approaches can help organizations determine how to put players in advantageous positions on the court.



The trick, as Buffett would say, is knowing when you’re playing to your strengths and when you’re not. Munger is famous for answering the question, “How do you beat Bobby Fischer at chess?” by saying, “Play him at anything but chess.”



Munger is on the record as thinking that one’s IQ is far less important than having a well-stocked toolkit of mental models, staying within one’s circle of competence, and only playing when one enjoys a competitive advantage. He once said, “"A money manager with an IQ of 160 and thinks it's 180 will kill you. Going with a money manager with an IQ of 130 who thinks its 125 could serve you well."

Ted Williams swinging an axe and a bat. From 'The Science of Hitting'
Ted Williams knew hitting was like swinging an axe. A nice example of applying a mental model from one activity to another.


Even the guy with the highest IQ will do better when he plays where he has an advantage




LeBron James is a physical genius. In basketball terms, a 180 IQ is far from a fair assessment. He’s a 200+. But even he has benefited greatly from the kind of discipline Munger and Buffett advocate. Interestingly, he’s done so largely as a result of analytics. Similar to the way the Milwaukee Bucks are looking at individual muscles within the physical systems of its players, the Miami Heat have scoured what its players do within its system on the court.



Consider how LeBron’s game has evolved to take advantage of his historic talents. Grantland's Kirk Goldsberry charts the evolution of the world’s greatest basketball player from Cleveland to Miami. 

Here's what Lebron James's shot chart looked like his last year in Cleveland:


LeBron James shot chart, last year in Cleveland, by Kirk Goldsberry and Grantland
James's shots tended to be closer to the basket in Miami than in Cleveland.


LeBron James shot chart, comparing his last year in Cleveland and first year in Miami, by Kirk Goldsberry and Grantland


Lebron's shots continued to be of the higher percentage variety his second year; he took almost no three-point shots in 2011-2012. Goldsberry notes that he took barely any shots outside of 16 feet. James's efficiency helped Miami win the NBA championship that year--Lebron's first.

LeBron James shot chart, comparing his first and second years in Miami, by Kirk Goldsberry and Grantland


Amazingly, Lebron continues to evolve. Here’s what his shot chart looked like in 2013:


LeBron James shot chart 2013 by Kirk Goldsberry and Grantland

 
Despite the MVP award recently being bestowed on Kevin Durant, Goldsberry’s assessment that Lebron is basketball’s most valuable and its most versatile player stands. According to Goldsberry, Lebron “is acutely aware of his own game and his team’s strategy. He continues to find new ways to integrate his own evolving talents with those of his teammates, and he makes everyone better in the process. While it’s simple to label James a physical freak with outrageous basketball talents, that sells his progress, work ethic, and intelligence short. LeBron James is a basketball nerd who just happens to possess once-in-a-generation talent.” 

You don't need Charlie Munger to tell you that's a pretty good combination.

Will the Bucks Win?
Will the Milwaukee Bucks become winners? Lowe is skeptical, calling the Bucks open general manager job "probably the least appealing" of the six currently open NBA positions of its kind. But, there is some room for optimism. Lowe points out that the NBA’s new collective bargaining agreement aimed at creating “a system in which every team would be flexible enough to turn things around in one summer, NFL-style.” While he thinks that kind of parity is a “pipe-dream,” he remarks that the league “is undeniably leaner now than it was before.”

Lowe also recognizes a few attractive assets the Bucks possess, including "two intriguing young players in Giannis Antetokounmpo and John Henson"  and the a salary cap sheet that "basically resets after the 2015-16 season."
 
It could certainly be worse. Given the team's move to get in line with its peers and assess the general physical preparedness of its players, we can at least hope for a healthier season. Despite Lowe's pessimism, here's saying the team is finally headed in the right direction. And, in a year when it won just 18 percent of its games, the team's 25 percent chance of winning the draft means Bucks fans just might walk away from 2014 with a win. And a smile. Finally.


Thursday, May 15, 2014

Making mistakes is vital to creativity…so long as the mistake isn’t fatal


Creativity as rebellion

NPR ran an interesting piece on Philippe Petit, the guy who made his name by walking illegally by tightrope between the World Trade Center towers in New York City.

He sounds like an amazing guy. He’s just written a book on creativity. He’s also a self-described loather of such books. His is different, though, because he wants to spur risk-taking. The book is titled “Creativity, the Perfect Crime”. Its focus on creativity as a kind of transgressiveness is refreshing. 

Philippe Petit
Philippe Petit: creative rebel
Real creativity has to be rebellious. "My journey has always been the balance between chaos and order.”

Surfing the wave

Charlie Munger loves the microeconomic mental model 'surfing'

One of Charlie Munger’s favored mental models comes from microeconomics.

Foreshadowing Clayton Christensen’s concept of disruptive innovation,[i] Munger writes about the process of ‘competitive destruction’ that occurs in societies marked by rapid technological change. “You know, you have the finest buggy whip factory and all of a sudden in comes this little horseless carriage. And before too many years go by, your buggy whip business is dead. You either get into a different business or you're dead—you're destroyed. It happens again and again and again.

And when these new businesses come in, there are huge advantages for the early birds. And when you're an early bird, there's a model that I call ‘surfing’—when a surfer gets up and catches the wave and just stays there, he can go a long, long time. But if he gets off the wave, he becomes mired in shallows....”

Christensen’s take: "Generally, disruptive innovations were technologically straightforward, consisting of off-the-shelf components put together in a product architecture that was often simpler than prior approaches. They offered less of what customers in established markets wanted and so could rarely be initially employed there. They offered a different package of attributes valued only in emerging markets remote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream."

Those familiar with Munger’s thought are well acquainted with this idea and Munger’s take on how it operates and why it’s such a powerful model.

Petit and parkour

Petit’s case provides a very interesting example.

There’s a point in the interview when NPR’s Arun Rath asks incredulously about his longstanding interest and participation in parkour—the practice of moving through one’s environment as efficiently as possible while using only the human body (and regular clothes). Parkour artists try to use as much momentum as possible while safely navigating the obstacles their (often urban) environments present them.



Petit mentions that he got involved early on in the movement, which flourished in France several decades ago. Speaking “I have been performing in the street for more than 50 years: magic for basically 60 years, and the high wire 45 years. The beauty of it is that it's never the same. It's never easy. And yet, part of my art is to make it look easy.”

There’s a pay off for the hidden difficulty: it’s much of what observers find joy in. “Any activity such as parkour, such as wire-walking, any art that will rejoice in rebellious freedom,” Petit said, “is something that is going to enrich our lives.”

Parkour and fatal mistakes

Parkour wasn’t a huge mainstream phenomenon in the United States until recently. In fact, I’d guess few had heard of the activity before this famous scene in Daniel Craig ‘s debut as James Bond in “Casino Royale”.

When Casino Royale opened in 2006, “The Bourne Supremacy” had already made use of the shaky camera or ‘free camera’ technique[ii]. The movie made quite a splash with an opening scene that was more kinetic than probably any scene in the entire film’s history. No less an authority than Roger Moore calls Daniel Craig the best Bond ever, largely on the basis of that striking first impression. Moore said, “Yes, I thought Casino Royale was tremendous. I thought his action was quite extraordinary—he did more action in the first 30 seconds of the film than I did in 14 years of playing Bond. To me, he looks like a killer. He looks as though he knows what he’s doing. I look as though I might cheat at backgammon.”



Of course, in the film, there’s not much that can go wrong. But doing parkour in real life can be dangerous. It’s one thing to rebel, but the kind of rejoiceful celebration Petit is after is probably only possible when the stakes are high. If he had set a wire between a couple friends’ apartments two stories high in a Parisian suburb, he likely wouldn’t be as famous as he is today. Making a mistake on that tightrope at that altitude is fatal. Making some kinds of mistakes in parkour can be seriously dangerous, if not fatal. Certainly, were someone to attempt Daniel Craig’s Bond’s variety of parkour and make a mistake, it would be fatal.

Fatal mistakes from Politics...

Elie Kedourie in his book “Nationalism” treats nationalism as an ideology that tries to specify conduct according to a rote formula. It’s what Oakeshott calls ‘rationalism’ and is a pernicious example of what he calls ignoratio elenchi. It’s also a terrible side-effect of what Charlie Munger refers to as intense ideology. In the the book’s second edition, Kedourie responds to some reviewers, who leveled the complaint against him that he didn't "attempt to discuss whether nationalists should be conciliated or resisted." 

One of my former professors mentioned to me that an honest response from Kedourie would have been to take them out and shoot them, he instead argued in ‘his most archly Oakshottian manner’ writing, "A decision on such an issue is necessarily governed by the particular circumstances of each individual case, and whether its consequences are fortunate or disastrous will depend on the courage, shrewdness and luck of those who have the power to take it.  For an academic to offer his advice on this matter is, literally, impertinent:  academics are not diviners, and it is only at dusk, Hegel said, that the owl of Minerva spreads its wings." Kedourie took Hegel to mean that a culture's philosophical understanding reaches its peak only when the culture enters its decline.
 
During his or her time in office, about the best a politician might hope for is to act, intra vires, to help bring about less homophobic policies, or at least to act as foil against the most homophobic proposals of his rivals. Considering the political context in which people actually operate, though, whatever a politician might do is likely to be best done indirectly and subtly. Ignoratio elenchi in those lines of work can sometimes be fatal; no matter how nimble a politician or parkour artist, to act too directly in these endeavors is likely to render the participant unfit and unable to keep performing them.

Kedourie has it about right when he says that political action depends on "the courage, shrewdness, and luck" of the decision-takers.  I suspect even Richard Flathman would agree (ruefully) that an elected official should think long and hard before deciding to be "free-spirited."

And Investing

Whitney Tilson attended a Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting near the turn of the century and returned telling amazing and humorous stories about the goings-on. Charlie Munger offered a wonderful example of how one can commit a fatal mistake in investing by trying to tackle a problem their ill equipped to handle. "We don't consider [Warren Buffet's and Charlie Munger's company Berkshire Hathaway] in remotely the same business as Tiger and Quantum [both of which recently announced that they are closing down]. They are mostly buying and selling securities. We're structured poorly from a tax standpoint to own securities." (Corporations like Berkshire Hathaway pay a 35% tax rate on capital gains compared to 20% on long-term gains realized by private investment partnerships like Tiger and Quantum.) Munger added, "Soros couldn't bear to see others make money in the technology sector without him, and he got killed. It doesn't bother us at all [that others are making money in the tech sector]."

At the same meeting, Munger said, "When you mix raisins and turds, you've still got turds." He was talking about the benefits that the Internet and technology (raisins) provide to society compared to the evils of stock speculation (turds), but he may well have been talking about the person who knows lots of great stuff (raisins) but who also acts in areas where he doesn't know much of anything (turds).

A prime example of this phenomenon is the economists who "shared a Nobel Prize…went into money management himself...and sank like a stone.” Or former Harvard president Larry Summers, a remarkably intelligent guy by nearly any criteria, but one who erred significantly by investing Harvard’s cash account alongside its endowment, thereby exposing the university to a pretty massive liquidity risk. Summers mixed raisins with turds and and both he and the university paid a steep price.

Embracing Mistakes…so long as they don’t kill you

One of the primary benefits to Petit’s approach is that it allows for a healthy relationship with failure. Munger points to –even more radically looking to seek out and destroy his own best and most successful ideas.

Petit expresses a very similar sentiment, “I have discovered the my best teachers were my mistakes, and instead of covering a mistake with a list of excuses, I actually unwrap the mistake and I look at it and approach it, and I see why ... it's my fault, and that's how I'm going to learn. So, I love mistakes.”

So do I. It’s important to keep in mind, though, regardless of our pursuits the mistakes that can be fatal. Can't say I'm interested in making that kind of mistake.



[i] Munger’s example comes from his 1994 talk “A Lesson on Elementary, Worldly Wisdom As It Relates To Investment Management & Business” given to the USC Business School. Of course, Munger didn’t invent the idea either. Economist Joseph Schumpeter adapted a similar concept that Karl Marx had previously identified. Christensen first used the now ubiquitous phrase in his 1995 piece (co-authored with Joseph L. Bower) "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave" in the Harvard Business Review.
[ii] Shaky camera is a technique often associated with a ‘cinéma vérité’ style, but I don’t think that director Paul Greengrass and cinematographer Oliver Wood cared to produce a film the had a high degree of verisimilitude with any reality with which any of us are familiar. John Cassavetes was prominent in ushering in a hand-held camera revival to feature filmmaking in the 1970s, and I imagine Greengrass had his brand of stylized grittiness rather than a documentary approach—despite the fact that Greengrass does documentary work.

Friday, May 9, 2014

Runner, Doctor, or Investor: Passion is important. Some thoughts on Drs. Roger Bannister and J. Harris Walker


Born to Run

This week was the 60th anniversary of Roger Bannister's run to break the four-minute mile barrier. Bannister was my grandfather Harris Walker’s hero. He kept a print of the picture below in his house to commemorate Bannister’s amazing run breaking the previuosly unthinkable 4:00 mile . He loved athletics and watching track and field athletes compete—watching the Penn relays and the Olympics with him are some of my favorite memories. He loved to watch and talk about all kinds of athletes—from Carl Lewis to ‘Dan and Dave’ to Michael Johnson. He reserved special praise for Jim Thorpe, who he called the greatest athlete he ever saw, and Jesse Owens whose performance at the Berlin games likely remains the most impressive and important in Olympic history. 


My grandfather didn’t talk as much about Bannister, but every time he did it was obvious he revered him.

Roger Bannister breaking four-minute mile
Roger Bannister breaking the four-minute mile


I’m sure there were many reasons for the connection Walker felt. Perhaps it was what they shared in common. Bannister went on to become a doctor just as my grandfather had; both took their medical training at arguably their nation’s finest (and stuffiest) schools—McGill and Oxford respectively; they competed as amateurs when that term meant something. Maybe my grandfather simply loved his competitive spirit—I wish I could have talked to him about Bannister arguing recently that, despite the fact that the fastest mile time on record now stands at three minutes and forty-three seconds contemporary efforts have only bettered his best time by 13 seconds as modern surface is worth four seconds compared to the cinder track that he ran on.
 
Or perhaps my grandfather’s admiration stemmed from knowledge that Bannister had taken much of his motivation in achieving the world’s first sub-four minute mile from his failure to medal at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. I got a sense of his disappointment at not getting the chance to compete in the Olympics listening to an interview my grandfather gave to his son Bill. 

J. Harris Walker athletic awards
J. Harris Walker won a lot of races...but none in the Olympics

Speaking about attending the Olympic trials in Montreal in 1936 he was allowed to attend while serving a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints he received special permission from his mission president to attend he said, “It was in a rainstorm. I got second in the Broad Jump. And I got third in the Pole Vault…The fellow that beat me in the Broad Jump went to the Olympics and missed his take off every time.[i]”

Getting what they deserved


Charlie Munger has offered a strategy for doing well in life that could double as a track training program. “Spend each day trying to be a little wiser than you were when you woke up. Discharge your duties faithfully and well. Step by step you get ahead, but not necessarily in fast spurts. But you build discipline by preparing for fast spurts. Slug it out one inch at a time, day by day. At the end of the day – if you live long enough – most people get what they deserve.”

Munger also famously argues for a discipline that allows people to be aggressive in taking advantage of favorable situations. What people need, he said, “is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.” Or, in a more succinct form my grandfather (who upon hearing from his wife that I found his phone salutations to be too terse, quit hanging up as soon as he was finished talking and started closing with, “okay, fine.” And then hanging up) would probably prefer: Preparation. Discipline. Patience. Decisiveness.

Bannister’s coach Franz Stampfl made a similar point in urging him to run on May 6, 1954—the night Bannister broke the 4-minute barrier. Bannister quoted Stampfl as saying, “Although the conditions are not ideal, if you don’t take this opportunity, you might not forgive yourself for the rest of your life.” Bannister said he was right. And he was.

At the time, two other runners, American Wes Santee and Australian John Landy were closing in on the four-minute mark. “It all came down to whoever had the first chance in tolerable weather,” Bannister said. 

Bannister took his chance. As a result, just about all of us have heard of him. 

Theory and practice


Richard Flathman studied with Michael Oakeshott. Flathman draws heavily on Oakeshott in his political theorizing. One significant area in which he departs from his teacher, though, is in the relationships between theory and practice. Oakeshott posited a sharp break between theory (or at least philosophy) and practice; he thought doing one expressly meant not doing the other. The best contribution theory hoped to offer our practice for Oakeshott was that it might on occasion remove a little crookedness from our thinking.

Flathman is more optimistic about how theory can influence our practice. He believes that the two are ‘imbricated’, that they overlap like the scales on a fish. Thinking carefully about what we do, by this view, can and regularly does change the way we do things. Often for the better.

Terry Nardin explains Oakeshott’s position concerning why the belief that science has practical value is mistaken and based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between scientific knowledge and practical activity. “Riding a bicycle may illustrate the principles of mechanics, but bike riders do not ‘apply’ these principles, and a skill in riding a bike is not to be confused with being able to explain them. A knowledge of physics may help us grasp the motions involved in cycling, but it is useless in mastering the skill.” The reason?: “scientific principles ‘belong to a separate performance, the performance of explaining’.” By this view, theory has no effect on practice, only practice does.

Applying theory to practice in competitive running


Running offers a couple of examples that provide some nice insight into Flathman’s and Oakeshott’s respective positions on the relationships between theory and practice.

A runner who qualified for the U.S. Olympic trials in the 400-meter hurdles (I think it was in 2000, but I’m not sure. If anyone remembers which or has video, please let me know—I’d love to see footage again) was studying physics. His technique was unusual to say the least. Unlike all of the other sprinters, this athlete jumped as high as he could over each of the race’s ten three-foot hurdles.

I can’t remember the specifics of his argument, but I do remember thinking that it was one of the silliest things I’d ever heard as NBC ran the preview piece prior to his heat. (As I recall, he didn’t qualify for the team).

Unlike the contemporary analytics movement that has numbers driving radical changes in the way executives and even coaches approach sport, this runner’s conclusions were not based in data and empirical observation, but grounded in theoretical physics. This was a prime example of what Oakeshott would call ‘ignoratio elenchi’—the runner committed a fallacy of irrelevance.

Bannister’s example is a better case of applying ‘theory’, or at least research findings and testable hypotheses, to practice. 

While a medical student at Oxford, Bannister used insights gleaned from his academic training to consider how the human body performed. I’m sure his competition in athletics helped him to formulate fruitful hypothesis regarding his studied field, too. The New Yorker piece mentions that Bannister “studied running’s physiological demands, measured his own oxygen-consumption levels, and produced papers with titles like ‘The Carbon Dioxide Stimulus to Breathing in Severe Exercise.’” 

Over time, “Bannister discovered that running consistent lap times demanded less oxygen than varying the pace. So he focused on his quarter-mile splits.” In what has since become a classic training method, Bannister would take lunch breaks with a stopwatch to time each of his ten laps. He’d take two minutes of rest in between each quarter-mile. In just under half a year, his average time dipped from 59 seconds from 63. 

Passion is important


When asked why he went into medicine, my grandfather replied, “I don’t know, but maybe my little brother dying, and nobody knowing what he died from motivated me. That might have had a little bit of influence.” From that beginning, he wound up loving what he did professionally. He continued to expand his knowledge—frustrated by getting stuck doing all the difficult surgeries as a doctor in a small practice in his hometown of Raymond, Alberta, Canada, Walker continually pursued opportunities to expand on his knowledge base. Midway through his career, he even took a plastic surgery residency in Salt Lake City, Utah, and wound up changing careers and moving countries.

Throughout his career, Walker brought the same passion for competing to his medical practice. 

Walker, J. Harris. Private. R.C.A.M.C. 12.2.43 Began Interne Period, Montreal Gen. Hospital, Feb 1, 1943
J. Harris Walker war record from McGill University archives


I also wonder if Bannister was the same way. Initially intrigued by studying what the body could do and attracted to scientific investigation into what improvements might be made, he still spoke longingly about running even as a old man, after he suffered a fractured ankle that permanently robbed him of the ability to run at all. Bannister was quoted in a lovely piece in the New Yorker as saying, “I remember, as a child, the experience of taking a few steps tentatively, and then I would start running, and then I would feel a sense of magic that suffused my motion. That feeling became grafted on to competitive running and stayed with me, even afterward. I never forgot it.”

Near the end of the New Yorker piece, author Jesse Will describes Bannister, still obsessed with running, asking people lined up for his autograph at a book signing questions like, “Are you quite interested in sport?” or “Why, you look pretty athletic,” or “You run what distance?” followed by “What’s your time?” Questions I heard my grandfather ask many times over the years.


[i] Interestingly, in the same interview, Walker also touched on the cinder tracks Bannister referenced, though, unlike Bannister, he probably benefitted from the surface relative to his competition. Walker said that the best race he had ever run was in 1932, the week after the Olympics. “I ran against Buster Brown from Edmonton. I ran against him in Calgary,” he said. “It was in the rain. That was in the days when we didn’t have asphalt tracks. We had cinder tracks, but in the rain it was muddy. Anyway, I ran against Buster Brown, who had got sixth the week before at the Olympics in Los Angeles. I knew he could beat me, or otherwise, I might have beat him. He beat me in the last stride. I was ahead of him the whole race and he beat me in the last stride. He just barely nosed me out at the tape.” He reported that both had run the 100 “in 10 flat, in the mud….That was when the world record was 9.3.” A powerfully-built athlete who would be persistently recruited to play professional rugby, Walker likely was bothered less by the muddy conditions and as a result made the race closer than it might have otherwise been.